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Abstract
Most European integration theories have perceived the Commission as a unitary actor with a
pro-integration agenda.Yet, empirical studies have shown that Commission actors harbor
contending views about European governance. These findings raise a theoretical problem for
European integration models, and an analytical puzzle for elite studies. European integration
theories claiming an independent impact of the Commission on European decision making, need to
disaggregate Commission motivations, which is the central purpose of this article. Consistent with
recent elite studies, I employ an institutionalist lens to analyze how rules may impact orientations,
but I refine the lens to assess institutional socialization and choice in multi-layered institutional
settings. I formulate six hypotheses about the interplay between three settings relevant to top
Commission officials: Commission, multi-level governance, European public space. Analytically,
Commission officials appear reasoned individuals capable of selecting incentives rather than
passive subjects of socialization. Evidence comes from 130 interviews and 80 questionnaires,
collected in 1995/6 from A1-2 officials, analyzed through interpretative and quantitative analysis. I
find that Commission officials constitute a special microcosm of the European public space: less
nationalist than most citizens, but divided on the mix of intergovernmental and supranational
architectural principles; center-left of the average political actor, but disagreeing on the desirable
mix of market and state, opportunity and equity.
Kurzfassung
Die meisten Theorien der Europäischen Integration fassen die Kommission als monolithischen
Akteur mit einer Integrations-freundlicher Haltung auf. Hingegen haben empirische Studien
gezeigt, daß die Akteure der Kommission durchaus unterschiedliche Auffassungen über das
europäische Regieren haben. Diese Ergebnisse stellen ein theoretisches Problem für Modelle der
europäischen Integration und zugleich eine analytische Herausforderung für Elitenstudien dar.
Theorien der europäischen Integration, die einen unabhängigen Einfluß der Kommission auf die
europäische Entscheidungsfindung behaupten, müssen die Motivationen der Kommission
disaggregieren, was die zentrale Aufgabenstellung dieses Artikels ist. In Übereinstimmung mit der
jüngeren Elitenforschung verwende ich einen institutionalistischen Ansatz um zu untersuchen, in
welcher Weise Regeln Orientierungen beinflussen; allerdings adaptiere ich diesen Ansatz, um die
institutionelle Sozialisation und politische Positionierung im Mehrebenensystem zu bewerten. Ich
formuliere sechs Hypothesen über die Beziehung zwischen drei für hohe Kommissionsbeamte
relevanten Umfeldern, nämlich Kommission, Mehrebenensystem, europäische Öffentlichkeit. Aus
analytischer Sicht erscheinen Kommissionsbeamte eher als vernünftige Individuen, die in der Lage
sind, Anreize selbst auszuwählen, und nicht als bloß passive Subjekte der Sozialisation. Das
empirisches Material stammt aus 130 Interviews und 80 Fragebögen, die 1995/6 von A1-2-Beamten
gesammelt und qualitativ und quantitativ analysiert wurden. Ich stelle fest, daß
Kommissionsbeamte einen speziellen Mikrokosmos der europäischen Öffentlichkeit bilden:
weniger nationalistisch als die meisten BürgerInnen, jedoch hinsichtlich des richtigen Verhältnisses
zwischen zwischenstaatlichen und supranationalen Prinzipien gespalten; Mitte-links des
durchschnittlichen politischen Akteurs, aber mit unterschiedlichen Ansichten bezüglich des
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I. Introduction
This article examines the political orientations of a strategically placed subset of Europe's political
elite: senior career officials in the European Commission, the executive-bureaucratic motor of the
European Union. Neofunctionalist and state-centric theories of European integration have usually
assumed that the Commission is best perceived as a unitary actor--predisposed to pursue a federal
Europe and expand the European agenda (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Sandholtz and Stone 1996;
Schmitter 1969, for neofunctionalism/ Garrett 1992; Moravcsik 1993; Taylor 1991, for
intergovernmentalism; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis
1994, for formal models; Cram 1993; Pollack 1996 for overviews). However, many recent empirical
studies of particular policy areas, decisions, or EU political events have illustrated how turf battles
and ideological divisions among Commissioners, services or individuals produce cracks in the
"monolith" (Nugent 1997). So while most theorizing on European integration has traditionally taken
the predispositions of Commission actors as a constant, many descriptive studies have considered
them as variables. This disjunction between theoretical assumption and empirical finding would not
matter much if the Commission were effectively controlled by member states, in ideal principal-agent
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The assumption becomes deeply problematic in light of neofunctionalist theories, who have posited
that the Commission exerts an independent impact on European decision making not reducible to
serving one or the other principal, and it is this view which has now prevailed in the field (for an
overview, see Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996). It is time to revisit the assumption of the Commission as
a unitary actor.
The question is whether one can be systematic about the variation in predispositions among
Commission actors. Consistent with recent elite value studies (Rohrschneider 1996; Searing 1994)
this article uses an institutionalist approach, where institutions are not merely understood as the set of
constraints and opportunities within which purposeful actors pursue their goals but also as reservoirs
of norms and rules that help shape actors' orientations (March and Olsen 1989; Steinmo, Thelen,
Longstreth 1991; Ostrom 1991; North 1990; for a discussion of various institutionalisms, see Hall
and Taylor 1996). However, prevailing approaches are ill-equipped to deal with multi-layered
institutional settings like the European Union, in which senior officials live. I develop an
institutionalist lens that enables to focus on the interplay of various institutional settings, and how
they impact on political orientations.
2
I analyze political orientations of A1 and A2 officials, the top career officials in charge of the
administrative apparatus in the Commission, through controlled blending of qualitative and
quantitative methods. The data come from 130 in-depth taped interviews and 80 mail questionnaires,
collected from the same pool of A1 and A2 top career officials between July 1995 and November(1).
In the first section, I discuss alternative conceptualizations of the political views of senior
Commission officials and formulate six hypotheses. Through interpretative analysis of the
interviews, I suggest in section two which dimensions appear to structure their political orientations.
In section three I reconsider these propositions in light of a factor analysis, applied to value
statements from the mail questionnaires. In the final section, I examine in greater detail contention
among Commission officials.
I.A. Commission officials as political actors
This study examines the political orientations of the top administrators in the Commission. Out of
4,000 Commission officials involved in European policy making, it concerns the 200 career civil
servants of A1 or A2 grade who occupy positions as director-generals, directors and senior advisors.
Most studies have tended to concentrate on the executive layer of the European Commission, the
college of Commissioners, that is, the twenty high-profile politicians who are appointed for five years
by member states and European Parliament to give direction to the executive-administrative motor of
the European Union (Bardi, Pasquino 1994; Landfried 1996; Page, Wouters 1994: MacMullen 1997).
However, the field of European integration lacks systematic studies that analyze and explain the
political orientations of senior Commission officials(2). Yet, they are strategically placed in
European governance, and their orientations count because they are relatively unconstrained by
European political masters, have a constitutional obligation to propose EU priorities, and are
relatively free from career sanctions.
3
The role played by senior civil servants is usually a hybrid of bureaucratic routine and politics
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1980; Suleiman, Mendras 1995; Wood, Waterman 1991, 1993; for an historical overview: Page
1985). In the European Union, several features tilt the balance heavily towards politics. As a recent
recruit and former national politician remarked: "Here, everyone is taking part in [politics], so it's
difficult to see where politics ends and where administration starts... I thought when I came here that
I left the political road and went back in public administration. Then I found that there is as much
politics here as in the [national] cabinet." (Senior official, 014). Nearly all senior officials would risk
a battle to get things done, 67% is prepared to bend rules to achieve results, and 58% believes that
officials should express their ideological convictions even at the risk of conflict with colleagues(3).
In contrast with the ideal-typical Weberian bureaucrat, senior Commission officials are comfortable
with their political role.
Senior Commission officials are uniquely placed to be political animals. In the first place,
Commission officials have competing political masters. In contrast to its constituent states, the
European Union does not have a single political executive. The Council of Ministers and the college
of Commissioners vy for control (Nugent 1997; Page 1997). Secondly, Commission officials, in
conjunction with the College, have a constitutional obligation to play a prominent political role. In
contrast to their national counterparts, they have the unique competence to initiate and draft
legislation, and they have the formal responsibility to be the engine of integration (article 155, EC).
Thirdly, once nominated to a top position, senior Commission officials are relatively insulated from
their political bosses. Politicized recruitment and promotion rules in the Commission make it hard
for officials to plan their careers. More importantly, weak disciplinary rules, and the fact that changes
in individual positions affect the overall delicate balance among nationalities and parties make it hard
for political patrons to make or break the careers of senior officials. These three structural features
provide powerful incentives for senior Commission officials to play a political role. In some ways,
they are less constrained than politicians, for in contrast to the latter, they are free from concerns
about re-election or short-term government popularity. Their political orientations are worth
exploring. 
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II. Influences on political orientations
II.A. An institutionalist lens
The first generation of elite studies has demonstrated the limited explanatory power of
socio-demographic characteristics (social origin, education, gender...) to explain role perceptions
among elite actors. Recent studies have argued for a nuanced understanding of the institutional
context within which elite actors define their roles (Searing 1991, 1994; Rohrschneider 1994; 1996).
Common to these institution-sensitive approaches is the emphasis on the imperfect capacity of
political institutions to mold elites' core orientations. They point at different mechanisms of
imperfect institutional molding. Some focus on processes of institutional learning, which imply that
shaping orientations takes time (Rohrschneider 1994). Generational change and diffusion may
accelerate convergence of their orientations, but generally one would expect individuals to take in
new institutional values gradually. Others concentrate on processes of institutional choice, that is, the
interplay between purposive individuals with independent reasons and institutional context.
Institutional contexts are rarely crystal-clear and so there is usually room for purposive individuals to
define, select, and manipulate rules and norms (Searing 1991). The extent to which institutions mold
individual orientations depends on the actual balance between rules and reasons. 
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institutional contexts simultaneously. The fragmentation of political authority, and the erosion of
hierarchy among levels of governments and between public and private spheres has made governance
multi-layered (Mayntz, Scharpf 1995), and that is certainly so for European governance (Héritier
1996; Kohler-Koch 1996; Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Risse-Kappen 1996; Schmitter 1996).
Multi-layered political settings send diverse, sometimes contradictory incentives to elite actors.
Rather than uniform role prescriptions, elite actors obtain a "menu" of possible motivations,
orientations and attitudes (Hooghe 1997). To hypothesize about the relative impact on orientations of
relevant institutional settings, I move the institutionalist lens from one setting to another so as to
assess their interplay from different angles. In defining where they stand politically, senior officials
are influenced by their professional links with the Commission, their activity in a system of
multi-level governance, and their membership of a politicizing European public realm (Hooghe
1997).
5
II.B. Commission officials as professional employees 
The assumption underlying the "unitary actor" model is that organizations are driven by self-interest.
Bureaucratic organizations are budget or competence maximizers (Niskanen 1971; Dunleavy 1991).
So the Commission can be expected to promote ideas that will increase its standing, and that should
make it strive for a pro-integrationist agenda. This reasoning assumes moreover that socialization in
Commission institutional preferences is effective. Senior Commission officials have had an average
service of 17 years, so one would expect the argument to carry some weight. The immediate
institutional environment--the Commission--appears as a closed world able to mold their orientations
quite perfectly.
Hypothesis I: To work for the Commission pushes Commission officials uniformly in a
pro-integrationist direction.
Commission officials as actors in multi-level governance. 
EU multi-level governance is characterized by fragmentation of authority and interlocking of actors
across national-European and public-private boundaries (Marks, Hooghe, Blank 1996; Peterson
1995; Richardson 1996; Schmitter 1996), where Commission officials produce proposals and
navigate them past manifold veto points in decision making (Peters 1992; Richardson 1996; Héritier
1996).
Many empirical studies assume that this political setting is too fragmented to shape actors' political
orientations. European governance is perceived as a conglomerate of issue-specific, relatively
self-sufficient networks solving particular identified problems and run by an ad hoc collection of
actors. What motivates actors are not big questions of European governance, but incremental
objectives or concrete problem solving. The relevant institutional setting for Commission officials is
the issue-specific network.
Hypothesis II: Fragmented authority in multi-level governance inhibits consistent
political orientations on European governance among Commission officials: no
structure is underlying their views.
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However, multi-level governance depends on consensus building or generalized reciprocity to
prevent deadlock (Héritier 1996), and so participants are likely to develop moderate orientations.
Senior Commission officials, who are pivotal in channeling decisions, can be expected to be
particularly keen on moderate views (Abélès, Bellier 1996; Christiansen forthcoming). 
Hypothesis III: Interlocking in multi-level governance induces Commission officials to
converge towards median orientations on European governance.
Commission officials are saddled with divergent expectations in EU governance. Progress in a
non-hierarchical interlocked system is usually most likely if the system is responsive to affected
actors, and senior Commission officials should be particularly sensitive to these incentives. However,
they are also expected to identify new areas of European collaboration and come up with innovative
solutions, which requires autonomous thinking. 
Hypothesis IV: Tensions between mediating and innovative tasks in multi-level
governance produce contention among officials about the value of responsiveness versus
autonomy vis-à-vis their interlocutors.
Commission officials as participants in the European public realm. 
Several authors have argued that European politics-- issues, actors, process--increasingly resembles
domestic politics (Caporaso 1996; Hix 1994; Hooghe, Marks 1997; Laffan 1997; Ross 1995;
Schmitter 1996; Wallace 1996). Political parties, trade unions, interest groups, subnational
authorities, voters, along with national governments and supranational policy makers, are contesting
how Europe should be configured politically. In collaborative work with Gary Marks, we hypothesize
that this contestation can be conceived as a two-dimensional political space, with on the horizontal
axis a left/right scale from social-democracy to market liberalism, and on the vertical axis contention
on political architecture with a continuum from nationalism (bottom) to supranationalism (top).
Moreover, we detect a hardening of contestation around two competing designs for Europe: a Europe
of regulated capitalism and one of neoliberalism (Hooghe, Marks 1997; Ross 1995). The projects are
comprehensive packages of institutional reforms, which pull in, like magnets at opposite ends of a
plane, political actors across Europe to join one of two competing coalitions. We hypothesize the
emergence of a dominant cleavage dividing left-leaning supranationalists and right-leaning
nationalists (Hooghe, Marks 1997).
7
One could argue that officials should be among the first actors to incorporate this contestation in their
orientations, because they deal intensively with actors harboring such divergent views and because
they themselves are early mobilized "European" citizens. The assumption is then that the institutional
context of European politics crowds out other influences: Commission officials are subsumed in the
universe of European political actors:
Hypothesis V: Contention in the European public space penetrates the Commission,
dividing Commission officials along left/right and nationalist/supranationalist lines that
reflect variation among European political actors.
Alternatively, Commission actors are likely to approach this political contention through the prism of
the other relevant institutional contexts, and these should push them to the center (influence of
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smaller than for political actors outside the Commission.
Hypothesis VI: Contention in the European public space structures contention among
Commission officials, but the variation is limited by their allegiance to the Commission
as supranational institution and their mediating tasks in multi-level governance. 
No doubt, one could formulate more hypotheses with this institutionalist strategy, but these six seem
to cover much of the potential explanatory terrain. Two hypotheses (I and III) suggest converging
political orientations; hypothesis II predicts unstructured orientations; the latter three specify
structured contention about European governance. So the research question is double: 
Do senior Commission officials have consistent or unstructured views on European
governance (hypothesis II versus others)? 
If their views are consistent, are these shared or is there contention (hypotheses I and III versus
hypotheses IV,V,VI)? 
8
To address these questions, I blend qualitative-interpretative methods with quantitative analysis using
two types of data. The next section summarizes findings from a focused interpretative reading of 130
in-depth interviews. I seek to make the orientations of senior Commission officials intelligible by
describing and categorizing their principal desires and beliefs and the connections among them. The
six hypotheses serve as guides for this exercise, suggesting alternative lenses through which
Commission officials may value their political environment. But once orientations categorized, they
become explanatory devices, because they posit connections between particular orientations and
particular institutional rules. So they explain how and why particular rules in a multi-layered
environment matter in structuring reasoned choices of Commission officials(4). Some readers may
contest the validity of such typological reconstructions, as interpretative analysis is an unusual
method in comparative politics. In section three, I present an exploratory factor analysis of value
items on the political environment of Commission officials (n=80). The dimensions that emerge from
the factor analysis, using a separate dataset, correspond closely to the results of the qualitative
analysis. In conjunction with interpretative analysis, the data allow in the final section to suggest a
plausible alternative to the "unitary actor" view of the Commission.
III. EU governance through the eyes of senior Commission
officials
In their study of foreign policy makers, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith make a strong case for taking
accounts by elite actors seriously: "Our actors interpret information, monitor their performance,
reassess their goals. The leading idea is that of reasoned judgment, not of manipulation." (Hollis and
Smith, 1986). Actors define their goals and motivations in ongoing dialogue with the rules that
structure their environment; they are neither puppets on a string nor 'thick' rationalists calculating
utilities of particular strategies to achieve given ends. Much research on political orientations has
tended to downplay this interplay between rules and reasons, or uses simplified understandings of
rationality (Searing 1991, 1994).
Interpretative analysis suggests that a senior Commission official is preoccupied with three questions
on European governance(5). How he answers these questions and connects them with his
institutional environment approaches best hypotheses six and four.
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1. Objectives: what social model should the European Union promote? Should it be oriented to
free markets and individual enterprise, or should it support a solidaristic society? 
2. Architecture: what should Europe's political architecture be? Should it be organized along
intergovernmental or supranational lines? 
3. Clienteles: what should the Commission's relationship be with its clienteles, that is with
national and subnational administrations, public and private interest groups that are affected by
Commission activities? Should the Commission be responsive, or should it strive to be
insulated from contending interests? 
I expect that a significant proportion of the variation in the political orientations of senior
Commission officials can be understood in terms of these dimensions. 
III.A. Objectives: Political-Regulators versus Market-Liberals
Hypothesis I seems implausible from the start, because the institutional signals sent by the
Commission are mixed rather than uniform. Conventional theories have often pictured the European
Commission as keen on European state-building. However, that presumption runs counter to another
recognized feature of European integration, with implications for the role of the Commission. As
Fritz Scharpf has shown, European integration is essentially a market-creating enterprise, and this is
reflected in institutional asymmetries privileging market-liberal policies to market-enhancing
regulation (Streeck 1996; Scharpf 1996; Leibfried and Pierson 1995). The strongest competencies for
the Commission are in market-creation like competition policy, external trade, or customs (Nugent
1995); agriculture is the one exception. Thus Commission officials should promote market-liberal
objectives and hence a severely restricted integration agenda. So while Treaties and Commission
competencies motivate them to reign in political regulation, bureaucratic and career interests or
socialization in the founders' spirit push them to an expansionist agenda of European-wide market
regulation. That tendency to conflicting views seems reinforced by a duality in the EU political
space, where proponents of regulated capitalism seem to contend with supporters of a neoliberal
Europe. However, senior Commission officials are under strong pressure to develop centrist positions
on state-market issues, as it is easier to navigate a proposal past veto points if it straddles different
ideological strands.
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Senior Commission officials face crosspressures of Commission environment, ideological contention
in the European political space, and the realities of complex decision making. Yet the bottom line
seems to be that Europe should be more than a common market. Beyond that consensus, officials
differ on what this political Europe should do. My reading suggests, in line with Hypothesis VI, that
the rift between proponents of regulated capitalism in the social- and christian-democratic tradition,
and supporters of a market-liberal polity, seems smaller than in the public realm. How do
Political-Regulators compare with Market-Liberals? Three features emerge from the interview
accounts. 
European social model or liberal market. Political-Regulators are defending a particular social
model: ".. I am proud that I have participated with Jacques Delors, as one of his lieutenants, in
imposing a certain model of European Union, where the values are solidarity, cohesion, local
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model for the creation of a market for 400 million inhabitants ... we are defending a cultural model,
neither the Japanese model nor the American model... but the social market economy... the Rhine
model. And that idea is shared from the south of Spain to the north of Sweden." (Senior official,
025). Not all senior officials agree: "..I have combated public interventionism, protectionism and
overregulation--that has been my mission to date, that has been my ambition." (Senior official, 114)
Center-Left or Moderate-Right. Behind these visions, one can discern left/ right tensions about the
relationship between state, market and society, but the language is devoid of the polarization
associated with traditional class-based politics. A Political-Regulator has doubts about the market as
a self-correcting mechanism; the state, at whatever level, is indispensable to reduce benefits for
winners and costs for losers: "... We should operate in those parts of the European spatial economy
that the market does not reach or that the market has let down. I would get into a wild argument with
the right-wing about the market. Maybe the market would be so long-coming to save those regions
that by the time the market gets there, there won't be any people left to save..." (senior official, 057)
For Market-Liberals, the priority is to stimulate growth through private initiative, not public
intervention: "The benefits are in the greater market as such, and in the opportunities we can create
[through a freer] market. " (Official's emphasis. Senior official, 055) 
Few Political-Regulators discard market ideas, and they are uncomfortable with a language of class
struggle. Moderation too on the side of Market-Liberals, who refuse to insulate market-oriented
policies from social policies: "How can you take that view? The fact is that whatever you do has
implications and repercussions in other areas!" (Senior official, 010). Supporters of Thatcherite views
on state and market are hard to find, even among Market-Liberals: "The UK government has a
problem... The House [i.e. the Commission] continues to work as if that viewpoint did not exist
because it is not part of the history of the process." (Senior official, 010)
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Political mobilization or institutional asymmetry. Political-Regulators are political mobilizers by
necessity. They fight against a liberal bias in the institutional set-up and the balance of power among
elite actors, and mobilize forces sympathetic to a European social model in the European institutions
but particularly outside among the public. Political-Regulators pay special attention to the European
Parliament. Unlike Supranationalists, who support the institution as an integral component of a
federal construction, Political-Regulators have policy reasons to fight for greater parliamentary
powers, because the European Parliament has traditionally supported environmental regulation,
redistribution, and social policy. "...We have the European Parliament that helps us a lot... Those are
our allies ... objective [allies]... even though they are often not so very comfortable allies."( Senior
official 047). Market-Liberals, on the other hand, are aware of their privileged position under current
rules: "There is no question that the balance has changed [in the European Union], that there is much
greater emphasis on greater opportunities rather than giving out money. Some people are pushing
more than others in that direction, and I am one of them." (Senior official, 010). If Market Liberals
support the Parliament-- and some do-- they do it because parliamentary approval gives legitimacy to
the market program: "There is no way you can have political legitimacy as a result of a sum of
national economies..." (Senior official, 010)
So Commission officials have divergent preferences about the social model Europe should pursue,
though the ideological distance between Political-Regulators and Market-Liberals is rather short.
III.B. Political Architecture: Supranationalists versus Intergovernmentalists
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the autonomy and authority of the national state. Has it consolidated the nation-state, as some have
argued (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1993, 1994), or has power been shifted away from the national
core to subnational and supranatonal levels of authority (Caporaso 1996; Marks, Hooghe, Blank
1996; Sbragia, 1993; W. Wallace 1996)? Senior Commission officials interpret, live and help
reshape this political architecture day by day. Because they are actors, their predispositions concern
us here more than their observations.
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If institutional socialization and bureaucratic self-interest mattered much, supranationalism should be
strong. However, Myles' theorem that "you stand where you sit" is difficult to apply to the European
Union. Constraints and learning in a multi-level governance system dilute the effects of Commission
socialization and bureaucratic self-interest. Intensive interlocking among actors obfuscates where
seats are, and it makes appear institutional designs with transparent divisions of power, such as
classic federalism or an association of sovereign national states, other-worldly. Even with these
simple designs off the table, though, there is still considerable scope for contention about who
participates under what decision rules. State-centrists have different theoretical reasons to expect
senior Commission officials to develop divergent orientations. To the extent that supranational
institutions serve the goals of member states (Moravcsik 1993), so nationality and national interest
should prevail over institutional socialization and bureaucratic self-interest. One would expect such
divergence to be reinforced by the European political debate, where due to vocal opposition from
nationalist groups the question of which political architecture for Europe has become salient.
Senior Commission officials struggle with crosspressures of institutional location, complex decision
making, the presence of powerful national states, and intensifying debate on the European political
architecture. Planted in the heart of the European Union, they are likely to rule out a Europe of
sovereign nation-states. That option would not only go against institutional socialization, or career
interests, but it would ignore the realities of increased economic interdependence and intertwined
policy making. "The problem is to find an efficient institutional construct--I am not only thinking of
economic efficiency, but also of political efficacy. We know very well that, politically, we need to go
beyond the nation-state." (Senior official, 027) Senior Commission officials accept a joint structure
of authoritative decision making in Europe--nobody seemingly wants to travel south of
intergovernmentalism to meet Euro-skeptical nationalism, and this is where hypothesis VI becomes
more plausible than hypothesis V. The differences among officials center around a desirable balance
between intergovernmental and supranational principles, and three of them stand out.
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Europe as goal or instrument. For a Supranationalist, the dominant issue in European Union politics
is about the future of European integration. "I am not in the business of right-wing or left-wing
policies. ...Whether we promote European integration, that is what counts. ... [Ideology] is the wrong
axis. We are most divided on another axis: pro-integration or anti-integration." (Senior Official, 058).
An Intergovernmentalist does not share this great zest to build Europe: "For me, it is something
realistic, concrete, and inevitable." (Senior official, 120).
Democratic or technocratic. For Supranationalists, building Europe means making Europe
democratic. Technocratic efficiency and persuasion alone will not bring about an integrated Europe;
politicization and increased participation will. "You need a technocratic plan and a democratic plan.
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democratic progress, with increased powers for the Parliament--not enough, but it is getting better.
...We have gone very far on that track, but we need real democratic control." (senior official, 058)
The Commission should encourage Europeans to become citizens: "... I believe that is our task: to
make of subjects active members of the European Union. ... My role is to introduce the citizen in
Europe." (Official's emphasis, senior official, 070) Not so an Intergovernmentalist, for whom the
European Commission should be an instrument to help produce better policies, and the political
objectives should be set elsewhere. "I am an official servant of the European construction. I have
tried to make Europe as relevant as I could in the various policy areas I have been responsible for.
But I am convinced that this construction must remain very attentive to national sensitivities ...We
know very well that the national states must maintain a very important place in the [European]
construction." (Senior official, 027)
Activism or Mediation. A Supranationalist usually loves a good institutional fight, in which he comes
down on the side of the Commission. "... I love everything having to do with defending the
prerogatives of the Commission vis-à-vis Council and Parliament." (senior official, 070).
Intergovernmentalists find this institutional bickering a waste of time and energy: "I am interested in
better policies ... this is important. The part played by the Commission: minor problem.... Fighting
for the Commission's prerogatives is counterproductive and ridiculous." (Senior official, 120) 
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Intergovernmentalists are policy makers, not politicians, with a realist(ic) view of Europe. Europe is
there, and it is useful to the extent that it achieves better solutions to common problems. It is
essentially made; it has happened. "We are within the European Union with various partners: the
Council, the Commission, the Parliament.... And what really counts is that we have a successful
policy." (Senior official, 120)" Supranationalists are political animals with a radical view of Europe.
For them, Europe is in the making: "We are building Europe, we are building a new society, we are
building a better continent." (Official's emphasis, Senior official, 058) But for both, the bottom line is
that the political nature of the European Union is not at stake, and here officials set themselves apart
from the public opinion(6).
III.C. Commission Clienteles: Eurofonctionnaires versus Responsive
Euroservants 
The relationship between civil servants and their clienteles is a defining feature of a civil service.
There is significant variation among western democracies. French fonctionnaires tend to take a
detached, slightly superior attitude towards "particularistic" interests (Suleiman 1975). British civil
servants are inclined to consult but like to have the last word. German Beamten administer through
dense, stable networks with organized interests. American bureaucrats work hard to nurture
relationships as stakeholder support largely determines policy success (Page 1985). This is not the
place to explain these varied relations. Suffice it to realize that European officials, like their national
counterparts, are compelled to define their relationship with their clienteles. I hypothesize, in
concordance with hypothesis IV, that the relationship, the desired balance between autonomy and
responsiveness, is contested in Commission ranks.
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A special source of contention is that Commission officials are not national civil servants. As
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counterparts in international organizations, more vulnerable than nationals vis-à-vis their clienteles.
First, they have a harder time justifying what their "added value" is. National civil servants can claim
to speak for the public interest, that intangible though powerful notion of the public good (especially
in Europe). They can do so more credibly than their interlocutors. International civil servants,
however, are likely to be asked to tell which public and which interest they refer to. Furthermore,
officials in international organizations face powerful alternative loci of authority in the form of
national governments. National communities may ultimately be imagined (Anderson 1983), but a
vast range of realities reinforces their imagined boundaries: a national flag and hymn, welfare
services, a legal system, a constitution, a particular organization of local government, a seat in the
United Nations and in the Council of Ministers. International communities are being invented as
well, but the tangibles of life that refer to such constructs are far and fewer in-between. The notion of
international public interest has a shallow base in reality. For international officials, there is often an
uneasy tension between being responsive to the material world of the national parts and representing
the largely potential world of the international whole. European officials should have an easier task
than international civil servants as European decisions now influence people's lives in concrete ways.
A senior official summarizes the shift: "...Twenty years ago we were the servant of the European
ideal. Today we are the servant of the European citizens. This is the difference. Because today,
Europe is a reality." (My emphasis, senior official, 044). Imagining the European public interest has
now a firmer base in reality, but still -- it is no match for the powerful notion of national public
interest.
Against this background, senior Commission officials think about the desirable relationship with
their interlocutors. In a system of multi-level governance, senior officials should feel more
comfortable with an approach that emphasizes mutual dependence between actors, and reaches
decisions through persuasion rather than imposition or unilateral action. On a continuum autonomy/
responsiveness, most should be closer to the latter. For these Responsive Euroservants, networking,
partnership, and openness for a variety of views and forms of governance are essential (Metcalfe
1992, 1996). However, networking could make Commission officials vulnerable to capture by
national or other interests: mutual dependence could become dependency. So some Commission
officials may prefer instead a European civil service which stays distant from national and other
special interests. For a Eurofonctionnaire, insulation becomes a buffer against capture. Three
principles constitute foci for divergent orientations between Eurofonctionnaires and Responsive
Euroservants.
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Identity. A true Eurofonctionnaire steps out of his nationality to become a-national: "It is of course
wrong to say that one does not have anymore a passport, a nationality, like de Gaulle exclaimed....
But it is also true that one should try ... to lose one's national identity, no, not to lose it but to make
abstraction of it. ... I have many links with [my country], but my thinking is not anymore like a
[countryman]." (Senior official, 080) Out of the mélange of different national cultures a new identity
emerges. The contrast is great with a Responsive Euroservant, who seeks to represent and highlight
the different components in the mÈlange: ìI like my service to be a microcosm of the Community. I
like my colleagues to reflect the diversity within the Community. ... You know there's a certain
wonderment in that. There's a certain mystery as to how people with such different backgrounds can
work together." (Senior official, 030)
Commission unity or independent mind. Creating the true European in spirit and mind is not
sufficient for a Eurofonctionnaire. An official should give priority to the unity of the European civil
service, not to his own ideas. "I find very often that people have their own agenda and they push it
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whole, it should be much more coherent than it is now." (Official's emphasis; Senior official, 055) A
Eurofonctionnaire is abhorred by the infighting in the Commission. For a Responsive Euroservant,
the Commission is an arena where certain priorities can be pursued, not a purposeful organization
with which one should invariably identify. Responsive Euroservants do not believe in the virtue of
Commission unity. They feel that innovation usually comes from small groups of like-minded
people, usually Commission insiders but often inspired by outside contacts, who use the rules to push
through a particular idea. "If you put together a few people who are visionnaire, a Commissioner, a
head of unit, or director ..., you can do things." (Senior official, 022) Good policies grow out of
clashes between ideas. Unity and team-spirit are not unconditional virtues for Responsive
Euroservants.
Making or Taking Cues. A Eurofonctionnaire does not simply act upon orders, but is in the business
of identifying priorities from his European vantage point. A Responsive Euroservant finds it hard to
believe in a separate European viewpoint. He takes his cues from people and interests around him.
A new European identity, unity and team spirit in the Commission, and a calling to lead are for a
Eurofonctionnaire the building blocks of a European public function. "That is what public interest is.
Outside influences... don't weigh." (Senior official, 058) Respect for Europe's diversity, the
Commission as a privileged arena for action, and a calling to be responsive are central for a
Responsive Euroservant.
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IV. Dimensions of Contention
I use data from the mail questionnaires to certify these dimensions, which are operationalized with
seventeen issue indicators set out in Table I (see Appendix). 
IV.A. Attitude Structuring Among Senior Commission Officials
An exploratory factor analysis, using principal component method and varimax rotation, generates
three dimensions that correspond closely to results from the interpretative analysis. However,
confirmation of the argument would require further testing with more robust data (or a larger sample)
and a refinement of the hypotheses. Each independent factor has an eigenvalue of more than 1.5.(7)
The results appear in Table I, which includes factor loadings of .30 or higher. The three factors
explain 41.2 per cent of the variance, which indicates that the structuring of political orientations is
rather high. So the answer to the first research question is positive, and hypothesis II seems
untenable. However, the structuring is not overwhelming. Either the items do not fully capture the
political constructs in the officials' minds (validity problem), or, in addition to systematic factors,
there is a considerable dose of randomness in how Commission officials form political orientations
(nonsystematic components) (King, Keohane, Verba, 1994).
| Table I |
The first factor captures the relationship between Commission officials and their
clienteles--responsiveness versus autonomy, which comes close to hypothesis IV. The factor includes
all six hypothesized statements, and explains 17 percent of the variance. Note that officials who fear
control by national interests tend to be apprehensive about special interests as well. What is at stake,
then, are comprehensive contending beliefs about how to deal with the outside world, not specific
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The next two dimensions correspond to hypothesis V or VI. Factor two is the left/right dimension,
juxtaposing those who favor political regulation against those supporting a market-liberal Europe.
Against expectations, the internal market item fails to load significantly (and negative) on this
left/right dimension, suggesting that the internal market program is not a major bone of contention
between Market-Liberals and Political-Regulators. The grand coalition (Hooghe, Marks 1997;
Sandholtz and Zysman 1989) that pushed through the internal market program in the mid-1980s
seems to be holding, at least in the Commission. With six out of seven predicted indicators, factor
two explains 13.1% of the variation.
The third factor refers to the political architecture dimension, including all five predicted indicators.
A high loading for the internal market item (but less than .40) means that Nationalists/
Intergovernmentalists are more likely to support the internal market than Supranationalists. So
contention about the internal market is not motivated by ideology, but by different conceptions of
political architecture. This factor explains 10.9 per cent of the variance.
IV.B. Summary
In section one I have formulated six hypotheses on how a multi-layered institutional setting might
influence political orientations of Commission officials. It is time to tie the findings of the qualitative
and quantitative analyses together to assess these hypotheses, while also highlighting the limits of my
analysis.
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1. Commission officials differ on three non-overlapping aspects of their political environment(8).
The Commission is not a unitary actor with a given pro-integrationist agenda (hypothesis I),
nor a heterogeneous collection of individuals with unstructured views on European governance
(hypothesis II). However, it would be wrong to infer that the Commission socialization is
ineffective, and so that Commission incentives are crowded out by other institutional
incentives. The interpretative analysis has shown that contradictory norms appear embedded in
the immediate Commission environment, particularly market-liberal integration-restrictive
norms in the asymmetrical competence structure, as opposed to pro-integrationist norms
suggested by bureaucratic organizational interest. Further research should clarify whether the
mechanism of institutional socialization is ineffective, or whether the message is more
heterogeneous than often assumed by European integration theories(9). 
2. Senior Commission officials think and care about politics: they have clearly structured political
orientations. We should keep in mind, however, that in defining their role, they surely have
other motivations as well. Only an analysis of all components of role definition could explain
how they prioritize political motivations versus non-political ones, such as preferences on
problem solving, or views on good administration etc. Yet, the interpretative analysis lets us
hypothesize that the relative importance of political and non-political motivations is partly
function of their political views. Supranationally-oriented officials are more likely to consider
themselves political animals than intergovernmentalists; similarly, officials favoring regulated
capitalism are more likely to prefer a politicized role than market-liberals. 
3. The political designs supported by senior officials differ from those in the European public
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social model ultimately implies the choice of a particular political architecture (Hooghe, Marks
1997). However, in the eyes of Commission officials, factor two (social model) and three
(political architecture) appear independent according to the factor analysis. So in contrast to
what we hypothesize for European political actors, it is difficult to tell in advance whether a
Political-Regulator in the Commission is an Intergovernmentalist or a Supranationalist. 
4. Professional Commission links and mediation in a multi-level governance system mitigate the
impact of contention in the European arena. Clearly, the interpretative analysis upholds
hypothesis VI over hypothesis V (the factor analysis is too broad a brush to discriminate
between both). However, a conclusive test would require a comparative study of elite actors,
Commission officials, and voters. In the absence of such data, one could travel some distance
by getting inside Commission responses on individual issue items, and seeking parallels in
elite and mass surveys. I would expect to see a Commission two-dimensional subspace at the
core of a larger European political space of elite actors, both nested in an even greater space of
European voters (with the center of gravity of the two subspaces in the upper half of the
electoral space). 
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V. Contending Political Designs
If senior Commission officials are located at the core of the European two-dimensional political
space, they do not contend about the nature of the beast (Risse-Kappen 1996)--free trade or political
union--, but what should be constitutive principles of this polity. Commission officials form
preferences as if the Euro-polity were a mature state, as if it were uncontested as a legitimate locus of
authoritative decision making in European life. Table II gives a breakdown of the distribution of
Commission officials for the three dimensions. With a partial exception for Objectives, they hold
moderate positions, putting question marks behind hypothesis V.
| Table II |
V.A. Political union beyond the common market
Do some senior Commission officials favour a free trade Europe? The answer in Table III is "no": the
political nature of European integration is uncontested. High means on the top two items in Table III,
pertaining to whether a united Europe should be political or economic, demonstrate a
near-consensus. Hypothesis V seems difficult to maintain.
| Table III |
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There is broad consensus about four starting points for a political Europe. First, Europe should be
more than a free trade area (item one). Second, European integration should be driven by a political
agenda, rather than market forces or functionalist adaptation (item two). Third, a coherent project, a
"blueprint for the European future" should drive European politics, not a collection of discrete
decisions (item two). Finally, (implicit in item two) the Commission should watch over consistency
of European policy making with the political objectives of the Union. Commission officials often
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proposals, it is quite another to take responsibility for overarching EU objectives. In their
near-unanimous endorsement of political union, European vision, and Commission responsibility for
this vision, senior Commission officials stand squarely on one side of the European public debate.
V.B. Much regulated capitalism with a touch of market liberalism 
On the left/right dimension, positions of senior Commission officials do not coincide with
hypothesized median positions in the European political space. They seem to hold left-of-center
views on state-market relations. Political-Regulators have many colleagues who defend Europe's
social model, notwithstanding references to an extensive welfare state, social dialogue, cohesion
policy, and industrial policy (Table III, item three). More than 80 per cent accepts extensive
redistribution (through cohesion policy), which contrasts with cautious views among European
political elites(10). These results are tentative, but they suggest that hypothesis VI needs
modification.
V.C. Multi-level governance 
Like most other political actors, Commission officials reject radical designs and embrace a system of
multi-level governance (Table II, architecture). Beneath that consensus, they disagree on participation
and decision rules, and divisions among Commission officials mirror dissension among Europe's
parties and public. Among the leadership of the second-most supranational institution (second to
European Court of Justice), largely intergovernmental designs find considerable backing among
senior Commission officials (Table IV, item one and three), in concordance with hypothesis VI.
| Table IV |
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V.D. Summary
Senior Commission officials are united on political union; supportive of multi-level governance
though disagreeing on the intergovernmental-supranational mix; and greatly in favor of European
regulated capitalism though contesting modalities. How does one make sense of this "subspace of
political orientations", smaller and north-west of the hypothesized European two-dimensional space
(Hooghe, Marks 1997), and west of median predictions under Hypothesis VI? 
1. Delors factor. Under former Commission president Jacques Delors, who championed these
values, Commission socialization may have been more effective (Ross 1995; Cini 1996).
However, this argument finds only partial support with the data(11). 
2. Socialization lag. Institutional socialization takes time, especially if actors had been socialized
into different norms (Rohrschneider 1996). It is possible that the hardening of European
contention has not yet permeated the Commission. The lag-effect should be smallest among
recent recruits. But support from the data is weak(12). 
3. Institutional choice. Rather than one European public realm, it may be more useful to
distinguish two arenas, one defined by the electorate/ mass public and the other by elite actors.
Divergent messages from elites and public increase the range of motivations, values, norms
from which Commission officials may choose. On the nature of European integration, senior
Commission officials seem in line with Europe's elites members who support political
integration, while both are out of step with a more skeptical public opinion (Eurobarometer).
On state-market relations, senior Commission officials appear closer to the general public's
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deviate from elites is not high because these moderate values fall well within parameters set by
the christian-social-democratic majority among European elites. 
4. Limits of measurement. It is possible that the overwhelming support for regulated capitalism is
exaggerated, because selected items proved either non-contentious (cohesion policy perhaps,
though certainly a bone of contention outside the Commission), or too general or specific to
capture left/right variation. 
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VI. Conclusion
Most European integration theories have traditionally assumed that the Commission is a unitary
actor, wedded to a pro-integration agenda. Yet, an empirical analysis of the political orientations of
its top officials shows that senior Commission officials harbor contending views about how to
configure Europe politically. This finding raises a theoretical problem for European integration
studies, and an analytical puzzle for elite studies. If the Commission exerts independent impact on
European decision making, as prevailing theories contend, these models should revisit the unitary
actor assumption. A disaggregated notion of Commission motivations requires a systematic analysis
of variation. This article takes a first cut at categorizing variation of political orientations in the
Commission, more precisely of top officials. Consistent with recent elite studies, I employ an
institutionalist lens to analyze how rules may impact orientations. However, prevailing approaches
are ill-equipped to deal with multi-layered institutional settings, such as that of EU governance. My
analysis explicitly accounts for the fact that orientations may be influenced by several political
institutional contexts simultaneously. Analytically, senior Commission officials appear as reasoned
individuals capable of selecting incentives rather than as passive subjects of socialization processes.
Senior officials are influenced by three sets of institutional incentives: their professional links with
the Commission; their participation in a system of multi-level governance; and their interactions with
a rapidly politicizing European public realm. Using alternately interpretative and quantitative
analysis, I compare the plausibility of six hypotheses on how these settings might interplay, and
conclude in the form of a hypothesis: 
Hypothesis VII: Contestation in the European public space structures contention among
Commission officials, but variation is restricted by Commission socialization and
moderating incentives under multi-level governance, while their capacity to deviate from
the median depends on availability and selection cost of alternative "menu options"
offered by European elites and public. 
So senior Commission officials constitute a somewhat special microcosm of the European political
realm: less nationalist than average citizen or political actor, but divided on the mix of
intergovernmental and supranational principles of governance; center-left to the average political
actor but, though preferring regulated capitalism in the North-European continental tradition to an
Anglo-American free market model, they contend about the mixture of market and state, opportunity
and equity. Senior Commission officials interpret, live and help reshape European governance day by
day. Rather than being insulated in the Commission, they are strongly influenced by contending
views dividing Europe's parties, public, and governments. 
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Endnotes
(1) At the end of each interview, I left a questionnaire with the interviewee to be sent to me. It
contains behavioral questions, as well as 32 statements to measure attitudes to various controversial
issues. By early November 1996 I had received 80 questionnaires out of a maximum of 130. So the
questionnaire sample is a subset of the interview sample. A comparison of the samples on certain
characteristics (nationality, DG, length of service, Commission cabinet experience ) reveals no
sample bias. 
(2) The purpose of this paper is solely descriptive inference: to identify, categorize and place in
context. A subsequent paper explains what makes particular officials hold particular views.
(3) Data from the mail questionnaires (n=80). On the statement whether "Commission officials
should be prepared to risk a battle if they want to get things done", 31% respond 'yes, but with
reservations' and 67.5% 'yes'. The results for "To get things done, it is often necessary for a senior
civil servant to bend procedural conventions and informal rules" are 57.5% 'yes, but' and '10% 'yes'.
For "Senior civil servants should be willing to express their convictions, even if they risk conflict
with their colleagues", 45% says 'yes,but' and 13.2% 'yes'. 
(4) For a thoughtful discussion of the interpretative approach and its complementarity to quantitative
methods, which deeply influenced my own thinking, see Donald Searing (1994:21-28). 
(5) Technical note. The statistical analysis and the interpretative reading of the interviews were
carried out side by side, so that the methodologies informed one another. It was also possible to
check whether the excerpts illustrating typological features actually came from officials who
corresponded to the same type in the statistical analysis. Transcripts of the interviews and the dataset
can be obtained from the author for validation of the results.
(6) Though Commission officials are in line with Europe's political elites, as a 1996 survey among
elite decision makers demonstrates. On the question whether membership of the European Union was
a "good" or a "bad" thing, 94 % of top decision makers consider it "good", 2% "bad", and 4%
"Neither good nor bad". There is little variation across countries, the lowest in Sweden (84% good),
Denmark (84%) and the UK (86%). This is in sharp contrast with the general public where the
comparable figures from Spring 1996 are 48% a "good" thing, 15% "bad" and 28% "neither good nor
bad". Source: Eurobarometer. 1996. Top decision Makers Survey. Summary Report, Commission
(DG X). Telephone interviews with nearly 4,000 elite figures, with national quotas, among five
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EIoP: Text 1997-008: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-008.htmgroups: elected politicians, senior civil servants, business and labor leaders, media, academic and
cultural leaders.
(7) The standard Kaiser's criterion requires a minimal eigenvalue of 1.0, which would have withheld
six factors for 17 variables (and 63.6% of variation explained). A scree plot demonstrates a
downwards kick in the curve of variance explained after the third factor, which has an eigenvalue of
1.85. The eigenvalue for the fourth factor is 1.49. 
(8) A factor analysis with oblique rotation generates similar results; there are non-significant
correlations between factor I (Clientele) and factor II (Objectives) of .13, and between factor II
(Objectives) and factor III (Architecture) of -.05. So the factors are technically orthogonal.
(9) In a subsequent paper, I test whether location in market-liberal versus social Commission services
makes a difference.
(10) For top decision makers in Europe, regional policy, social policy and employment should be left
primarily to national governments (Eurobarometer, Top decision makers, Sept 1996). This seems to
support the observation that Commission officials stand to the left of most European elite actors.
(11) Centrist support on architecture and leftwing support on objectives are on average greater among
pre-Delors and Delors recruits than among post-Delors recruits. But that effect is weakened by
significant polarization inside pre-Delors and post-Delors recruits.
(12) Contention is more pronounced among recent recruits than "old hands", and the proportion of
intergovernmentalists and neoliberals is higher. But there is no significant difference between
newcomers from outside the Commission (without prior socialization) and those promoted from
inside the Commission (with prior socialization).
(13) One indication of differences among public and elites can be found in Eurobarometer data.
Elites and public were asked to rank ten problems and issues facing the EU according to importance.
The general public ranked "fight unemployment" first and "promote economic growth" eight, while
elites gave them respectively second and fourth place. (Eurobarometer. 1996. Top Decision Makers
Survey. Summary. Brussels, DG X).
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Factor Analysis of Attitude Indicators for Commission
Officials
Indicator (N=80) Factor I Factor II Factor III
Nationality interferes in official's judgment .72
Special interests disturb proper working .66
Certain DGs dominated by nationalities is hurtful .64
Commission too much administration, not enough government .62 -.40
This much infighting among staff will destroy Commission .53
Egoistic member states threaten European project .37
No united Europe without mature EU cohesion policy .80
Commission needs vision, blueprint for future .75
Europe should be more than common market .60
Commission should preserve unique model of European society .56
Too much influence of big business .30 .36
Member states should remain central pillars of EU .73
Commission should concentrate on administering efficiently .52
Subsidiarity- more power at lowest level, not for Brussels  .49
Commission should become true government of the European
Union
.37 -.46
Commission should concentrate on maintaining internal market .39
Support full legislative powers for European Parliament .35 -.37
Eigenvalues 2.92 2.23 1.85
Variance explained 17.2 13.1 10.9
Factor I:Commission Clienteles: Eurofonctionnaires versus Responsive Euroservants
Factor II: Objectives: Political-Regulators versus Market-Liberals
Factor III: Political Architecture: Intergovernmentalists versus Supranationalists
Table II
Distribution of Commission officials on each dimension (%)**
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Political-Regulator
versus Market-Liberal
Architecture
Intergovernmentalist
versus Supranationalist
Clienteles
Eurofonctionnaire versus
Responsive Euroservant
5 - High 25.0 10.0 16.3
4 -
Mid-High
42.5 20.0 22.5
3- Medium 17.5 46.3 32.5
2 -
Mid-Low
7.5 15.0 23.8
1 - Low 7.5 8.8 5.0
Mean*  3.7 3.1 3.2
* Scale from 1-5; Neutral Value=3
** Calculated on the basis of factor scores generated by the factor analysis. The categories are
created by dividing the range in five equal parts.
Table III
Political Regulation or Market Liberalism (%)
Item Yes Yes, but Neutral No, but No Mean*
1 Europe should be more than a common market 91.3 8.8 0 0 0 3.91
2 Commission needs vision, blueprint for future 73.8 20.0 0 5.0 1.3 3.66
3 Commission should preserve unique model of
European society
46.3 37.5 5.0 6.3 5.0 3.28
4 No united Europe without mature EU cohesion
policy
50.0 31.3 1.3 16.3 1.3 3.31
5 Too much influence of big business 6.3 25.0 1.3 53.8 13.8 2.24
6 Support full legislative powers for European
Parliament
10.0 31.3 2.5 28.8 27.5 2.25
* Range between 1 (No) and 4 (Yes); neutral position = 2.5
Table IV
Intergovernmentalism or Supranationalism (%)**
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but Neutral No,
but No Mean*
1 Member states should remain central pillars of EU 8.8 22.5 3.8 31.3 33.8 2.08
2 Commission should concentrate on administering
efficiently 17.5 35.0 1.3 33.8 12.5 2.58
3 Subsidiarity-more power at lowest level, not for
Brussels 
13.8 51.3 2.5 26.3 6.3 2.74
4 Commission should NOT become true government
of EU
20.0 26.3 3.8 33.8 16.3 2.52
5 Commission should concentrate on the internal
market
12.5 36.3 2.5 35.0 13.8 2.49
6 NO Support full legislative powers for European
Parliament
27.5 28.8 2.5 31.3 10.0 2.75
7 NOT true that the Commission is too much
administration, not enough government
10.0 47.5 3.8 22.5 16.3 2.53
* Range between 1 (No) and 4 (Yes); neutral position = 2.5
** Item 4, 6 and 7 are reversed to facilitate comparison with other items, which are phrased to
solicit approval from intergovernmentalists.
Appendix
Indicators for Factor Analysis
Objectives: Political-Regulators versus Market-Liberals. The indicators focus primarily on general
(item 1) and specific (2,3,4) socio-economic values. Political-Regulators and Market-Liberals differ
also in political strategy, tested with general (5) and specific (6,7) items. Six of the seven indicators
(exception item 4 on the internal market) are worded so that Political-Regulators are expected to
agree with them. 
Architecture: Intergovernmentalists versus Supranationalists. Items 8, 9 and 10 tap into where the
locus of political control should be: member states or Commission. Two other items have to do with
whether Europe should be technocratic or democratic (item 11 and 7). While three indicators should
elicit support from Intergovernmentalists, item 10 and 7 should provoke dissension. 
Clienteles: Eurofonctionnaires versus Responsive Euroservants. Four indicators focus on
Commission cohesion (12,13,14,15). Item 16 and 17 tap into whether Commission or member states
should set the agenda. All statements are worded to elicit support from Eurofonctionnaires.
1. Europe has developed a unique model of society, and the Commission should help to preserve
it: extensive social services, civilized industrial relations, negotiated transfers among groups to
sustain solidarity, and steer economic activity for the general welfare. 
2. No united Europe without a mature European cohesion policy. 
3. European Union policy is too much influenced by big business. 
4. The Commission should concentrate on maintaining the internal market. 
5. Europe should be more than a common market. 
6. The Commission cannot function properly without a vision, a set of great priorities, a blueprint
for the future. 
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even if the price would be to lose its monopoly of initiative. 
8. The member states, not the Commission nor the European Parliament, ought to remain the
central pillars of the European Union. 
9. The strength of Europe lies not in more power for Brussels, but in effective government at the
lowest possible level. 
10. It is imperative that the European Commission become the true government of the European
Union. 
11. The Commission should concentrate on administering things efficiently. 
12. A Commission which tolerates this much infighting among its staff will eventually destroy
itself. 
13. Too many Commission civil servants let their nationality interfere in their professional
judgments. 
14. It hurts the Commission's legitimacy that certain DG's tend to be dominated by particular
nationalities, such as agriculture by the French, competition by the Germans, regional policy by
the Spanish, environment by the north... 
15. Pressure groups and special interests, like trade unions, farmers organizations, industry,
environmental lobbyists, and so on, disturb the proper working of European government. 
16. The Commission acts too much as an administration, and not enough as the government of
Europe. 
17. The egoistic behavior of some member states threatens the very survival of the European
project.
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